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The "Hot Cargo" Dilemma
Local 1976, Etc. v. National Labor Relations Board
(Sand Door Case)'
The above Sand Door case, consolidated for hearing
with two other cases referred to hereinafter as the Ameri-
can Iron cases,2 resolved conflicting views of N.L.R.B. mem-
bers extending back over several years, as to the validity
and effect of so-called "hot cargo" clauses in collective bar-
gaining agreements. Without condemning such clauses as
being illegal per se, and without condemning all secondary
boycotts, a 6-3 opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter holds
that labor unions may be guilty of unfair labor practice in
violation of Section 8(b) (4) (A) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act,3 by inducing
employees of neutral employers to enforce such clauses.
The original National Labor Relations Act, popularly
known as the Wagner Act, having been intended to apply
only to employers, at least with respect to unfair labor prac-
tices, contained no reference to secondary boycotts by labor
unions. This type of boycott had been a traditional weapon
of some trade unions, often formalized in labor contracts
by a clause in which the employer agreed not to handle,
or require his employees to work on, what was colloquially
termed "hot goods" or "hot cargo". "Hot cargo" consists
of goods considered to be "unfair", or which are produced
or distributed by a non-union employer, or by one with
whom there is a primary labor dispute. By enlisting the
support of other locals or labor unions in boycotting the
"unfair" employer's goods, a union directly involved can
more easily bring him to terms. Since the boycott is exerted
through other employers with whom the employer under
attack does business, this type of secondary pressure fre-
quently results in penalizing neutrals who have little or
no control over the outcome of the original dispute. In the
Taft-Hartley amendments to the Wagner Act, such second-
ary activities are prohibited where the union induces or
encourages the employees of a neutral to refuse to handle
1357 U. S. 93, 78 S. Ct. 1011 (1958).
'N.L.R.B. v. General Drivers, Etc., Local No. 886, and Local 850, Int.
Ass'n. of Machinists v. N..L.R.B., ibid.
a 29 U. S. C. A. (1956) §158(b) (4) (A).
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or work upon goods for the purpose of forcing the neutral
employer to cease doing business with another person.4
It should be noted here that this provision has no applica-
tion where the secondary employer is not truly a neutral,
as for example where he is a subsidiary or is allied with
the primary employer.'
The prohibition, by its terms applies to activities aimed
at the employees of the neutral, and so, under recognized
rules of statutory construction, does not apply to dealings
by a union directly with the neutral employer. Conse-
quently, the "hot cargo" clauses take on a greater signifi-
cance. These clauses have been the subject of divided and
changing interpretations within the N.L.R.B. as to their
validity and enforceability. In Conway's Express,6 a ma-
jority of the Board decided that neither agreement upon
nor enforcement of a hot cargo clause violated Section
8(b) (4) (A). In 1954, however, in McAllister Transfer,
after a change in the membership of the Board, an opposite
result was reached.' In this case, two members adhered to
the Conway's Express doctrine, two members held a hot
cargo clause to be a violation per se of 8(b) (4) (A), and
the fifth member concurred in result, but not in reasoning,
with the latter. The holding, therefore, came down to find-
ing a violation where, under a hot cargo clause, the union
induced the employees of a neutral to refuse to handle
hot goods.
'Ibid.:
"It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents-
(4) to engage in, or to Induce or encourage the employees of any
employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the
course of their employment to use, manufacture, process,
transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods,
articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any ser-
vices, where an object thereof is:
(A) forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed
person to join any labor or employer organization or
any employer or other person to cease using, selling,
handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the
products of any other producer, processor, or manu-
facturer, or to cease doing business with any other
person ; .... "
5National Union of Marine Cooks and Stewards (Irwin-Lyons Lumber
Co.), 87 NLRB 54 (1949) ; National Labor Relations Board v. Somerset
Classics, 193 F. 2d 613 (2nd Cir. 1951) ; National Labor Rel. Bd. v. Busi-
ness Mach. & Office A., Etc. (Royal Typewriter), 228 F. 2d 553 (2nd Cir.
1955); Die Sinkers Union (General Metals), 120 NLRB No. 160 (CCH
55,424) (1958).
6National Brotherhood of Teamsters, Etc., 87 NLRB 972 (1949) ; aff'd.
Rabouin v. National Labor Relations Board, 195 F. 2d 906 (2nd Cir. 1952).
7International Brotherhood of Teamsters (McAllister Transfer, Inc.),
110 NLRB 1769 (1954).
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In 1955, when the N.L.R.B. decided the Sand Door case,"
again with a three-way division, the decision conformed to
the McAllister opinion.' While the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the "Sand Door" doctrine,10 it
was rejected by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
in a similar case." The Supreme Court granted certiorari
to resolve the dispute.
Before proceeding to the decision in Sand Door and its
companion cases, another N.L.R.B. ruling should be men-
tioned. In 1957, in a case involving a hot cargo clause in-
serted in a contract between the Teamsters and a motor
freight company which was engaged in carrying goods of
the Genuine Parts Company, against whom a strike had
been called, the Board extended its Sand Door doctrine
with respect to carriers. 2 Here again, as might be ex-
pected, the Board was divided, rendering four separate
opinions. Three members held that hot cargo clauses were
invalid per se, two confining this rule to carriers on the
basis of the Interstate Commerce Act's requirement that
carriers render service without discrimination, 3 and one
member contending that any such clauses were against
public policy. Therefore, a majority was in agreement
that, at least as to common carriers, hot cargo clauses were
invalid from their inception. The speculation this decision
aroused, however, was settled, at least for the moment, in
the Sand Door decision.'
The Sand Door case involved a dispute over the in-
stallation of certain doors distributed by Sand Door &
Plywood Company, which were allegedly made with non-
union labor by the Paine Lumber Company. A general con-
tractor, having purchased doors from Sand Door & Plywood,
was prevented by a representative of the Brotherhood of
Carpenters & Joiners from installing these doors. The union
representatives accomplished this by inducing the con-
tractor's foreman, in his other capacity as a member of the
Carpenters Union, to order employees to cease hanging
the doors. The labor agreement between the Carpenters &
1 Local 1976 (Sand Door and Plywood Company), 113 NLRB 1210 (1955).
A similar ruling was made in General Drivers Union (American Iron and
Machine Works), 115 NLRB 800 (1956).
1 Supra, n. 7.1 0National Labor Relations Board v. Local 1976, Etc., 241 F. 2d 147 (9th
Cir. 1957).
11 General Drivers, Etc. v. National Labor Rel. Bd., 247 F. 2d 71 (D.C.
Cir. 1957).
12 Teamsters, Local 728 (Genuine Parts Company), 119 NLRB No. 53
(CCH 54,979) (1957).
'849 U. S. C. A. (1951) §316.
'357 U. S. 93, 78 S. Ct. 1011 (1958).
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Joiners and the contractor provided that "workmen shall
not be required to handle non-union material". The Sand
Door Company charged a violation of 8(b) (4) (A) and
was upheld by the Board, in spite of the Union's reliance
for its defense upon the quoted contract clause. The Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ordered enforcement of
the Board's ruling.
The American Iron cases 5 arose from a strike called by
the International Association of Machinists against Ameri-
can Iron and Machine Works. The Machinists picketed the
premises of carriers who were transporting American Iron's
products, without clearly indicating that the dispute was
solely with American Iron. The Teamster's local which
represented the employees of the carriers specifically in-
structed these employees to cease handling the cargoes sent
by American Iron, in spite of the carriers' express orders
to continue carrying American Iron shipments. The con-
tract between the Teamsters and the carriers contained a
provision that "members of the [Teamsters] Union shall
not be allowed to handle or haul freight to or from an un-
fair Company, provided this is not a violation of the Labor-
Management Relations Act of 1947" and this clause was
set up as a defense against a charge of an 8(b) (4) (A) vio-
lation made by American Iron. The Board issued an order
to cease and desist against both Unions, but, on appeal, the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals enforced only the
order against the Machinists, finding that the contract
clause was a valid defense for the Teamsters' actions.16
The Supreme Court, in its analysis of 8(b) (4) (A),
pointed out that the term "secondary boycott" is not there
used; that the section prohibits only certain specifically
described union activity where it is aimed at a specific
objective. Therefore, a voluntary boycott by an employer
is not covered by the statute and ". . . a union is free to
approach an employer to persuade him to engage in a boy-
cott, so long as it refrains from the specifically prohibited
means of coercion through inducement of employees."17
The Court found nothing in the legislative history of the
Taft-Hartley Act, which it characterized as a compromise
between conflicting views on industrial relations, to indi-
cate that Congress had intended to outlaw all activity
which could be included under the label of secondary boy-
cott; a term which was noticeably omitted from the statu-
15 Supra, n. 8.
11 Supra, n. 11.
1 Supra, n. 14, 1016.
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tory language.' 8 The majority opinion pointed out that
while courts must construe statutes, due to the limitations
of language, the most relevant materials for such construc-
tion are the words themselves.
The Court rejected the argument of the Unions with
respect to hot cargo clauses, which could be summarized
as a denial that the protection of 8(b) (4) (A) over neutral
employers had any application to a neutral employer who
had in advance, as shown by acquiescence to such a clause
in his labor contract, waived such protection. While ad-
mitting the force of this contention, the Supreme Court
pointed out that to accept this view would be to deprive the
neutral employer of a free choice as to whether to handle
goods in a concrete situation as a result of a prior abstract
agreement made during the give and take of contract nego-
tiations. The policy of this section of the statute was in-
tended to give just such freedom of choice in a specific
situation, and to allow enforcement of a hot cargo clause
through the inducement of employees would amount to
coercion of the neutral employer regardless of the fact that
a prior agreement gave rise to the inducement. The Court
further observed that the expertise of the Board may well
have considered the reality of collective bargaining, in
which there may have been little voluntariness on the part
of the employer in accepting a hot cargo clause. Moreover,
if the Court were to authorize an approach to the em-
ployees by the union, under the guise of reminding them
of the contract provision, it could result in the neutral
employer's reluctant acceptance of a fait accompli - a con-
certed refusal by his employees to handle goods - which
would be something less than a voluntary choice by the
neutral employer.
After so holding, the Court left the door open for the
future when it said:
"It does not necessarily follow from the fact that the
unions cannot invoke the contractual provision in the
manner in which they sought to do so in the present
cases that it may not, in some totally different context
18 Supra, n. 14, 1016:
"... 8(b) (4) (A), like the entire Taft-Hartley Act was designed to
protect the public intereit, but not in the sense that the public was
to be shielded from secondary boycotts no matter how brought about.
Congress' purpose was more narrowly conceived. It aimed to restrict
the area of industrial conflict insofar as this could be achieved by
prohibiting the most obvious, widespread, and .. , dangerous practice
of unions to widen that conflict; the coercion of neutral employers ... ,
through the inducement of their employees to engage in strikes or con-
certed refusals to handle goods."
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not now before the Court, still have legal radiations
affecting the relations between the parties. All we
need now say is that the contract cannot be enforced by
the means specifically prohibited in §8(b) (4) (A).""
The Court also pointed out that the extension by the
Board of the Sand Door rule in the Genuine Parts case2°
insofar as that ruling could be considered to have invali-
dated hot cargo clauses in carriers' labor contracts, was
beyond the authority of N.L.R.B. It cannot outlaw all hot
cargo clauses for common carriers on the theory that they
breach the Interstate Commerce Act. The Board must
deal with their legality under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act. It was pointed out that rulings of the Interstate
Commerce Commission" are based upon a different statute
with different policies and legislative purposes. The fal-
lacy, as the Court saw it, in the application of the Inter-
state Commerce rule was illustrated by a hypothetical case
where the employer-carrier voluntarily decided to boycott
certain shippers. Since there would be no inducement of
neutral employees, there could be no violation of 8(b)-
(4) (A), but there would be discrimination against ship-
pers. In another earlier case,22 the Court had also held that
the rights established under the National Labor Relations
Act did not supersede the legislative objective of the fed-
eral mutiny statute. The Supreme Court proceeded to up-
hold the enforcement orders against the Carpenters and
Machinists and remanded the Teamsters case for enforce-
ment, but expressly based its decision upon the unions'
inducement of neutral employees to refuse concertedly to
handle the goods of the primary employer, and negatived
any consideration of the effect of the Interstate Com-
merce Act.
The holding of these cases may be briefly summarized:
Hot cargo clauses are not invalid per se and an agreement
between a union and an employer upon such a clause is not
in itself violative of 8(b) (4) (A); agreement upon a hot
cargo clause does not however vitiate this section of the
statute and, regardless of such an agreement, a union is
prohibited from inducing or encouraging employees of a
neutral employer to refuse in concert to handle goods of an-
other employer with whom there is a primary dispute; the
1' Supra, n. 14, 1020.
10 Supra, ns. 12 and 14.
n Galveston Truck Lines Corporation v. Ada Motor Lines, 73 MCC 617
(1957) ; Planters Nut & Chocolate Co. v. American Transfer Co., 31 MCC
719 (1942).
2 Southern S.S. Co. v. Labor Board, 316 U. S. 31 (1942).
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clause may not therefore be a valid defense by the union
against a charge of a violation of 8 (b) (4) (A) under the
circumstances.
The decision does leave, however, several problems un-
answered. While the hot cargo clause may not be a matter
of defense, could it be sufficiently enforceable to support
a suit for breach of contract under Section 30123 in a case
where, for example, the neutral employer ordered his em-
ployees, in the teeth of a contract clause providing other-
wise, to handle goods of another employer engaged in a
primary dispute and discharged those who refused?24
If such a suit could be maintained, the employer would
be compelled to engage "voluntarily" in a boycott or pay
damages. This would be a far cry from the obvious legisla-
tive purpose of shielding the neutral employer from being
coerced into being the ally of a union which is engaged in
a primary dispute with another employer. It is no answer,
in the actual world of labor-management relations, to say
that the employer had voluntarily agreed to place himself
in such a position. The Court took note of this in one part
of the opinion by referring to the abstract nature of a
clause such as a hot cargo provision during the negotiation
of an involved collective agreement. Since the employer
is often forced, by threats or expectations of a work stop-
page, to agree on many restrictions on its own activities,
it would be unrealistic to call the concession to a hot cargo
clause a voluntary act. While it would not be wise to
examine the voluntary nature of labor-management agree-
ments, it is not perhaps unreasonable to say, at least, that
a clause which ties the hands of management with respect
to a type of conduct singled out for condemnation by the
Congress should be declared a nullity in all respects. If
the hot cargo clause is "valid", it is valid for some purpose.
If not of any force as a defense against a charge of an un-
fair labor practice, it can only be effective as a weapon of
offense; nothing else remains. It would approach the realm
of make-believe to call voluntary a neutral employer's elec-
tion to live up to a hot' cargo clause rather than pay dam-
-29 U. S. C. A. (1956) §185(a):
"Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an Industry affecting commerce
as defined In this Chapter, or between any such labor organizations,
may be brought in any district court of the United States having juris-
diction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or
without regard to the citizenship of the parties."
14The prevalence of arbitration clauses would raise the question of the
effect of arbitrating a hot cargo clause. This problem is put aside here for
reasons of space and scope.
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ages, especially when the damage suit could only be
brought by his own employees' representative under the
authorization (or inducement) of such a clause.
The carrier is in a particularly difficult position inas-
much as he may face not only the dilemma referred to
above but may, in addition, be in danger of a suit by a
shipper whose goods he has failed to carry in attempting
to live up to a hot cargo clause.2 5 This type of employer is
in a most unenviable position, and it is no comfort to be
told that there are two legislative policies governing his
activities.
It would appear that, to avoid this impasse, the only
sensible solution would be to declare the hot cargo clause
invalid for all purposes on the ground of public policy, or
to uphold its validity for all purposes as constituting a
waiver by the signing employer. As the dissent in Sand
Door properly pointed out, the majority opinion is caprici-
ous in making the boycott "lawful if the employer agrees
to abide by this collective bargaining agreement . . . un-
lawful if the employer reneges", 5 thus implying judicial
approval of a refusal to abide by a labor agreement. The
course of upholding the hot cargo clause as valid can be
rationalized only by inferring that the legislative purpose
was solely to protect neutral employers against outside
interference with their employees. Thus, an employer who
signs a labor agreement containing such a clause could be
considered as having exercised a right to waive the protec-
tion of the section and could not complain when it is en-
forced against him by any means available to the union.
On the other hand, the complete invalidation of these
clauses would restore the situation which was envisaged
by Congress in the enactment of section 8(b) (4) (A): a
neutral employer's being genuinely free to make a decision
as to whether to continue to do business with another em-
ployer engaged in a labor dispute.
There is no question but that the Board and the Court
were correct in finding that the unions' activities in the
Sand Door and American Iron cases fell under the ban of
8(b) (4) (A). It does not necessarily follow, however, that
the limits established by this section with regard to the
nature of activities condemned as unfair labor practices
must give validity to other methods of enforcing secondary
2 The shipper recovered from a carrier who obeyed a hot cargo clause in
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Northern Pacific Term. Co., 128 F. Supp. 475
(D. C. Ore., 1953), and this is supported by language in Minneapolis & St.
L. Ry. Co. v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 215 F. 2d 126 (8th Cir. 1954).
1357 U. S. 93, dis. op ... , 78 S. Ct. 1011, dis. op. 1022, 1023 (1958).
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boycotts which lie outside those limits. If we assume 8(b) -
(4) (A) was intended to disapprove a result as well as
proscribe an act, it would be illogical to indorse the result
simply because it was accomplished by other methods or
the forbidden means were employed at an earlier point in
time. From a practical standpoint, if the employer is in-
duced by a threat of, or by an actual, work stoppage to
agree to a hot cargo clause, the very intent of 8(b) (4) (A)
is violated even though the boycott itself does not occur
until later. The particular means used to enforce the clause
would be, under this view, irrelevant except to the extent
that the direct approach to the employees of a neutral is
singled out for special censure as an unfair labor practice.
The concentration by the Court in Sand Door upon the
literal words of section 8 (b) (4) (A), which ignores the evil
Congress undoubtedly intended to eliminate - the widen-
ing of the area of a particular labor dispute - does not
advance the cause of industrial peace. While courts, as they
often piously declare, should not legislate, they should
however (and in fact often do) analyze the legislative pur-
pose behind the language of a statute and construe the
words in the light of that purpose.
CHARLES P. LOGAN, JR.*
Wife Cannot 'Sue Husband At Law For Tort
Against Her Property Interests
Fernandez v. Fernandez'
Plaintiff-appellant brought suit against her husband,
from whom she was living apart, in replevin to recover
certain of her chattels and damages for their detention. The
husband demurred to the declaration on the ground that a
wife could not sue her husband at law for the return of
property. The demurrer was sustained on that ground.
On appeal from the Circuit Court for Washington County,
the case was remanded for further proceedings without
affirmance or reversal.2
The appellant contended on appeal that the Maryland
rule against a wife's suing her husband at law for personal
injuries should not be extended to a case involving property
interests and cited authority from other jurisdictions in
* Member of Maryland Bar; LL.B. 1958, University of Maryland School
of Law.
1214 Md. 519, 135 A. 2d 886 (1957).
'Under MD. RULE 871 (a), allowing such procedure when the interests
of Justice can best be served thereby.
